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In a previous article, I described the Americans with Disabilities Act as a
"windfall" for defendants, based on the observation that defendants prevail in more
than ninety-three percent of reported ADA employment discrimination cases decided
on the merits at the trial court level, and in eighty-four percent of cases that are
appealed and available on Westlaw.2 These conclusions, and similar conclusions by
the American Bar Association,3 drew widespread attention from the media, because
they were counter to prior media portrayals of the ADA as creating a "lifelong buffet
of perks, special breaks and procedural protections" for people with questionable
disabilities. 4
My prior research focused on judicial outcomes in the employment
discrimination cases reported in Westlaw at the trial court and appellate levels.
Although the conclusions reflected an accurate description of the basic judicial
outcome data, they were not based on a close examination of these cases through, for
example, consideration of the types of claims of discrimination that were brought the
categories of disabilities of the named plaintiffs, or other factors. On the ADA's tenth
anniversary, I am investigating the judicial outcome data for the employment
discrimination cases through a sharper lens by working with a more detailed database.
The ADA has a broad scope. It comprises three major titles-employment (Title
I),5 public entities (ritle ]I),6 and public accommodations (Title I).7 Although ADA
enforcement can be credited with improvements in the accessibility of public
accommodations, 8 and increased services by public entities for individuals with
142 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1994 & Supp. m 1997).
2 Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfallfor Defendants, 34 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. REv. 99, 100 (1999) [hereinafter Colker, Windfall].
3 See American Bar Association, Study Finds Employers Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and
Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL& PHYSICALDISABmLrrYL. REP. 403,404 (1998).
4 See, e.g., Ruth Shalit, Defining Disability Down: Why Johnny Can't Read, Write, or Sit
Still, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 25, 1997, at 16.
5 Title I provides: "No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with
a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement or discharge of employees, employee compensationjob training, and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
6 Title II provides: "Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with
a disability shall, byreason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination
by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994).
7 Title III provides: "No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases
to), or operates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
8 See Ruth Colker, ADA Title III: A Fragile Compromise, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
377 (2000)[hereinafter Colker, Fragile Compromise].
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disabilities, 9 most of the reported litigation has involved issues of employment
discrimination. 10
Employment discrimination claims can be brought against both private and
public entities under ADA Title I, although public entities are also covered under
ADA Title I. ADA Title II employment discrimination cases incorporate the legal
standards of ADA Title 1.11 Thus, in assessing judicial outcomes, there is no reason
to distinguish between employment discrimination cases brought against public and
private actors. 12
ADA employment discrimination litigation is patterned on Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (CRA Title Vfl)13 and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 (section 504)14 Like CRA Title VII, ADA Title I requires claimants first to file
a claim of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 15
ADA Title I provides relief comparable to the relief provided under CRA Title VII
for claims of disparate treatment and disparate impact discrimination. Moreover, the
compensatory damages scheme embodied in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 applies to
the ADA (with some exceptions).16
Because it borrows from section 504 and its regulations, the ADA also has some
marked differences from CRA Title VII. People can only bring suit under the ADA
if they meet the definition of an "individual with a disability" that was previously
9 See, e.g., Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (holding that states are required to provide
community-based treatment for person with mental disabilities).
10 See Colker, Windfall, supra note 2, at 99 (1999).
11 See 28 C.F.R. § 35.140(b)(1) (1999) ("For purposes of this part, the requirements of title
I of the Act, as established by the regulations of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
in 29 CFR part 1630, apply to employment in any service, program, or activity conducted by a
public entity if that public entity is also subject to the jurisdiction of title I.").
12 Some ADA Title II cases do involve the question of sovereign immunity-whether
Congress exceeded its authority in creating a private cause of action for monetary damages against
state actors. Because that is a constitutional issue, rather than an issue of statutory interpretation,
I did not include cases which were resolved on that basis in the database. Thus, the cases brought
against public and private employers involved identical issues of statutory interpretation. I did code
for whether the defendant was public or private and found that variable was not significant in
predicting appellate outcome.
13 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-l-2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
14 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Disability discrimination claims can also
be brought under sections 501 and 503 of the Rehabilitation Act. Because section 504 has the
broadest coverage (coveting all entities receiving "federal financial assistance"), I will typically
refer to "section 504" as a shorthand for all Rehabilitation Act disability discrimination cases.
15 See 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (enforcement).
16 See Civil Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.C. § 1981a(aX3) (1994 & Supp. 1111997) (providing
that compensatory damages may not be awarded under the ADA when the covered entity has
demonstrated "good faith" in seeking to identify a reasonable accommodation).
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codified in section 504.17 Moreover, they are entitled to "reasonable
accommodations" so long as those accommodations do not pose an "undue hardship"
to the employer.' 8 Employers are also allowed to offer some unique defenses such as
that the individual with a disability poses a "direct threaf' to the health or safety of
others.19
Part I of this article descnes my database design. In Part I I set forth how ADA
judicial outcomes compare to judicial outcomes under other statutes, including Title
VII. My research suggests that the appellate litigation outcomes under the ADA are
more pro-defendant than under other civil rights statutes.20 I do not want to overstate
my observation: to fully know how ADA litigation compares to litigation in other
fields, one would need access to settlement and verdict data, as well as trial court data.
My data are limited to appellate outcomes available on Westlaw. But because
appellate decisions have an important influence on the development of precedent in
a circuit, and are usually the data source most available to practitioners and the media,
this conclusion is important.
In Part 111, I consider one hypothesis for why ADA appellate outcomes may be
more pro-defendant than under other statutes-that the ADA is a new statute,
experiencing an early period ofjudicial uncertainty. With the passage of time, one
might expect these results to even out so that plaintiffs would be pursuing on appeal
only those cases that have a reasonable chance of success.
My results-which will be described more fully in Part Il--do not lend support
to the judicial uncertainty notion, because appellate judicial outcomes have remained
relatively constant since 1994. Having determined that judicial uncertainty has not
been a factor in predicting ADA appellate outcomes, in Part IV I investigate what
factors best predict successful (or losing) ADA appellate employment discrimination
cases. First I will ask whether the distinctive textual aspects of ADA cases, such as
the concepts of disability or reasonable accommodation, associate with pro-defendant
outcomes. Second, I will discuss what other factors were found to predict pro-plaintiff
or pro-defendant outcomes. My overall conclusion is that the unique features of the
17 The three-part definition ofa person with a disability dates back to 1974. When Congress
originally passed section 504, it used a more narrow definition of the term "handicapped
individual," which was limited to concems with a person's employability. See Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 7(6), 87 Stat. 355, 361 (1973). When the Act was amended in
1974, Congress amended the definition of "handicapped individual" to include the three prongs
that have remained the basis of section 504 ever since. See Rehabilitation Act Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, § 11 1(a), 88 Stat. 1617, 1619 (1974). The ADA simply substituted the
words "disability" for the words "handicapped individual." Section 504 was subsequently
amended so that it also uses the word "disability" rather than "handicapped." See Rehabilitation
Act Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-220, § 403, 112 Stat. 936, 1101 (1998).
18 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (defining "undue hardship").19 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (defining "direct threat").
20 See generally, Colker, Windfall, supra note 2, at 99 (1999).
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statute do not explain the strong pro-defendant record of the appellate courts. The
most important predictor of success by plaintiffs appears to be EEOC participation,
being represented by counsel, and the circuit in which plaintiff litigated. There was
a modest trend towards certain types of disabilities associating with positive outcomes
but these results are likely to disappear, or even reverse, in light of intervening
Supreme Court decisions. Demotion claims also appear to achieve more favorable
results than other theories of discrimination but these results are based on a sample
of nineteen cases and may disappear over time.
These are results from early years of a new statute. It will be interesting over time
to see if plaintiffs respond to this overwhelming pro-defendant record of appellate
judicial outcomes by appealing fewer pro-defendant outcomes. 21 My comparative
Title VII data suggests that enormous changes over time have occurred in judicial
outcomes under that statute. Appellate judicial outcomes in the first seven years were
decidedly pro-plaintiff; today, they are decidedly pro-defendant. Appellate judicial
outcome data, therefore, would appear to be able to fluctuate considerably over time.
Hence, this early snapshot of ADA appellate employment discrimination litigation is
only the beginning of a long-term assessment of ADA appellate outcomes.
21 A recent Supreme Court decision under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
however, may cause plaintiff lawyers to appeal more adverse summaryjudgment decisions. See
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000) (concluding that the court of
appeals impermissibly substituted its judgment concerning the weight of the evidence for the
jury's). In my previous empirical article on the ADA, I concluded that overuse of the summary
judgment device by district courts and courts of appeals had resulted in markedly pro-defendant
outcomes under the ADA. Colker, Windfall, supra note 2, at 101. The Reeves decision may help
halt the overuse of the summary judgment standard if Justice Ginsburg's prediction in her
concurring opinion proves to be correct. Justice Ginsburg observed:
As the Court notes, it is a principle of evidence law that the jury is entitled to treat a party's
dishonesty about a material fact as evidence of culpability. Ante, at 2108, 12. Under this
commonsense principle, evidence suggesting that a defendant accused of illegal discrimination has
chosen to give a false explanation for its actions gives rise to a rational inference that the defendant
could be masking its actual, illegal motivation. Ibid. Whether the defendant was in fact motivated
by discrimination is of course for the finder of fact to decide; that is the lesson of St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 125 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1993). But the inference
remains-unless it is conclusively demonstrated, by evidence the district court is required to credit
on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, see ante, at 2110-2111, that discrimination could not
have been the defendant's true motivation. If such conclusive demonstrations are (as I suspect)
atypical, it follows that the ultimate question of liability ordinarily should not be taken from the
jury once the plaintiff has introduced the two categories of evidence described above.




My research method is to read and code appellate ADA employment
discrimination decisions22 that are available on Westlaw.23 These appellate opinions
are nonrepresentative of all judicial opinions in two important respects: (1) they are
appellate opinions and (2) they are opinions that are available to the public. These
factors require special caution in research of this kind.
Appellate opinions tend to involve appeals of various pre-trial motions, such as
dismissals or summaryjudgments that hinge on issues of "pure law." Parties can only
appeal final judgments, so a denial of a request for summary judgment is rarely
appealed. Appellate opinions do not tend to involve appeals of verdicts, because such
outcomes are often heavily fact-based. And, of course, they rarely involve appeals of
settlements. It is commonly estimated that most cases settle so appellate decisions do
not give us information on the most common type of case.24 Further, they rarely
22 1 excluded three kinds of cases which satisfied these criteria. First, I excluded cases
involving the question of whether arbitration should take place, because the decisions in those
cases did not involve any ADA-specific issues. Plaintiffs often prevailed on the question of
whether arbitration could be required in these cases on appeal. Including them in my database
would give me a skewed sense of what characteristics caused plaintiffs to prevail on appeal.
Second, I excluded cases that were patently frivolous because they sued non-covered defendants
or were clearly brought outside the statute of limitations. These cases were usually brought pro se
and offered little substantive explanation of the operation of the ADA, since theyraised no genuine
issues for litigation. Third, I excluded cases that were resolved solely on non-ADA issues such as
evidence questions, constitutional issues, or attorney fees. Although I did hire students to assist me
in coding the cases, I personally made every decision to exclude a case from the database. I also
checked or coded every case in the database.
23 1 found these decisions by using the search term "Americans with Disabilities Act' in the
U.S. Court of Appeals (CTA) database on Westlaw. This search provided a list of cases which was
overinclusive, because it included nonemployment cases and non-ADA cases that mentioned the
ADA. These extra cases were eliminated from the database. I included cases irrespective of
whether they were actually "published" in the federal reporter system. Although there maybe some
ADA cases missed by this search method, due to human error or a failure by an appellate court to
refer to the "Americans with Disabilities Act," I suspect they are very few.
24 The category of settlement is particularly complex under the ADA, because the statute
requires all complaining parties to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC (or a state Fair
Employment office) before receiving a right to sue letter. Of the charges filed with the EEOC
through September 30, 2000, 5.5% resulted in settlements, 5.0% resulted in withdrawals with
benefits, and 1.8% resulted in successful conciliations. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNnrY COMM'N, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) Charges FY 1992-FY
2000, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-charges.html (last modified Jan. 18, 2001). Thus, 12.3%
of all claims resulted in a pre-trial resolution that was favorable to the plaintiff. In addition, the
EEOC found reasonable cause to believe that discrimination had occurred in an additional 3.5%
of the cases, but was not able to obtain a successful conciliation. Of the 87.7% of the claims in
which a voluntary resolution is not achieved, there is no way to know what percentage of these
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provide information on the verdicts that may have been rendered. Thus, in my
database of 720 appellate cases, I found that only 60 cases (8.3%) were appeals of
verdicts. Of these 60 cases, only 37 constituted pro-plaintiff verdicts.25 Although
these 37 cases represented only 5.1% of the cases in my database, it is wrong to
conclude from this fact that plaintiffs obtain favorable verdicts in 5.1% of all ADA
cases. Because of the legal barriers to appeals of factual determinations, it would be
foolish for plaintiffs or defendants to appeal most adverse verdicts. My database
cannot precisely answer the question of what percentage of ADA cases result in
favorable verdicts. 26 It can tell us only how the appellate system handles those
verdicts on appeal.
Opinions available on Westlaw are also not reflective of all appellate opinions.
There has been extensive discussion elsewhere of the differing publication practices
among the circuits.27 By conducting my research on Westlaw, I avoided some of
those problems but not all of them. I was able to include all decisions made available
by the courts rather than limiting myself to opinions made available through the
federal reporter system. Nonetheless, as I reported in a previous article, circuits are
inconsistent in the extent to which they allow nonpublished opinions to be made
available to Westlaw.28 The variation in the number of cases found for each circuit
may be reflective of differing publication practices rather than the actual number of
decisions rendered in those circuits.29
cases resulted in litigation and, if so, what percentage resulted in pre-trial settlements. The EEOC
does not track the cases once a right-to-sue letter has been issued. Of the more than 141,000 cases
that could have resulted in a claim of discrimination filed in a court of law, only 720 (0.63%) are
reported in my database.
25 See Table 2, infra p. 249.
26 Lexis does have a verdict database. Westlaw used to make a verdict database available to
its educational subscribers. I explore the verdicts under ADA Title I1 in another article. See Colker,
Fragile Compromise, supra note 8. The EEOC's web site, however, reveals that 11.6% of all
claims filed with the EEOC resulted in a pre-trial resolution that was favorable to the plaintiff and
an additional 2.9% obtained a reasonable cause finding (without voluntary conciliation). See U.S.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 24. Given that claimants can file with
the EEOC at no expense to themselves, so that there is little incentive to avoid frivolous
complaints, this figure may suggest that complaining parties have a reasonable chance of success
at obtaining a favorable outcome in a pretrial context. For further discussion of these figures, see
Kathryn Moss et al., Outcomes ofEmployment Discrimination Charges Filed under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1028 (1999).
27 See, e.g., Daniel N. Hoffman, Nonpublication of Federal Appellate Court Opinions, 6
JUST. SYS. J. 405 (1981); Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue II, Studying the Icebergfirom Its
71p: A Comparison ofPublished and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 L. &
SOC'YREV. 1133 (1990).
28 See Colker, Windfall, supra note 2.
29 For further discussion of courts' differing publication practices, see Deborah Jones Merritt
& James J. Brmdney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts
ofAppeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71 (2001).
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The most important caveat that emerges from these considerations is that
appellate investigations in the employment discrimination area reflect a selection bias.
The largest categories of cases that are decided on appeal are dismissals and summary
judgment motions. Dismissals are, by definition, a pro-defendant outcome. Although
plaintiffs can theoretically attain a victory through summary judgment, that is a very
rare outcome. Thus, in my database of 720 cases, 88 (12.2%) involved appeals of
dismissals and 540 (75%) involved appeals of pro-defendant summary judgment
decisions. By contrast, only 2 appeals involved appeals of pro-plaintiff summary
judgment decisions. Again, it is wrong to conclude from this data that 87% of all
ADA cases result in dismissals or pro-defendant summary judgment decisions 0 But
it is correct to conclude that 87% of the cases appealed and made available on
Westlaw had resulted in dismissals or grants of sunmaryjudgment for defendants at
the trial court level.31
As Professors Eisenberg and Schwab have noted, there are three potential
perspectives on judicial outcomes: (1) the perspective of the law professor or student
who reads published appellate opinions, (2) the perspective of an appellate judge who
sees all filed appeals and decides which appellate opinions should be published, and
(3) the perspective of the district court judge who sees all filings and has a ground
level iew of litigation.32
When they made that observation in 1990, categories one and two were markedly
different because unpublished opinions were not generally available to the public.
With the expanding publication practices of Westlaw and Lexis, the first and second
perspectives have become a bit less distinct. Only 375 of the 720 cases in my
appellate database reflect 'published" decisions that are available in the federal
reporter system. The 345 unpublished opinions do not reflect all filed or decided
30 Because a final judgment is required before an appeal can be taken, "[a]n order dismissing
the case is immediately appealable, but an order denying a motion to dismiss or a summary
judgment would not be appealable." Marc A. Franklin, Rinners and Losers and Why: A Study of
Defamation Litigation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 455,468 (1980)[hereinafter Franklin, Winers
and Losers].
31 It is interesting to note that the EEOC reports that it attained merit resolutions in 15.7% of
the charged filed under the ADA from 1992 to 2000. See U.S. EQUALEMWLOYMENT OPPORTUNnrY
COMM'N, supra note 24. That 15.7% figure includes 3.5% of their cases in which they found
reasonable cause to believe that discrimination had occurred but were not able to obtain a
successful conciliation. If one subtracts the 3.5% figure from the 15.7% figure, one gets 12.2%.
In other words, the EEOC's data shows that only 12.2% of claimants obtained a favorable result
in a pre-litigation context. My data shows that only 13% of plaintiffs obtained a favorable result
at the trial court level, if the case was appealed to the court of appeals and made available on
Westlaw. Based on the EEOC's data, there is no reason to conclude that my 13% figure is
unreflective of the actual litigation results of all plaintiffs in ADA lawsuits irrespective of whether
the decision is appealed and made available on Westlaw.
32 Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions of the Federal Court
System?, 56 U. CI. L. REV. 501,503 (1989).
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appeals but do broaden the perspective of the law professor or student who engages
in computerized research. As of January 1, 2000, three circuits (Third, Fifth, and
Eleventh) did not make their unpublished opinions available to the public. Because
unpublished opinions are overwhelmingly affirmances of pro-defendant results at
trial, it appears that reliance on publicly available opinions overstates plaintiffs'
success rates on appeal. 33 More importantly, the practice of not making unpublished
opinions available means that my database will overstate the tendency of the Third,
Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits to reach pro-plaintiff results.
In any event there is no way that someone who relies on computerized search
techniques can have the perspective of the district court judge, because the majority
of filings result in settlement and many decided cases do not result in opinions made
available to the public. I therefore cannot claim that my research gives us much, if
any, insight on the perspective of the district court judge. Because of the growing
database available on Westlaw, however, it does give us a fuller picture of appellate
outcomes than would reliance only on published opinions.
I. SuccEss RATES UNDER THE ADA AND OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION
A. Definition of "Winning"
In order to compare ADA judicial outcomes to judicial outcomes under other
statutes, one needs to have a definition of what it means to "win" under the relevant
statutes. There are two different ways to think of the concept of "winning." First, one
could say that plaintiffs have only "won" if they prevailed at trial and that decision
was affirmed on appeal. Second, one could say that plaintiffs have won if their trial
court victory was affirmed on appeal or they convinced the appellate court to reverse
a pro-defendant trial court outcome. This second definition of winning is a broader
definition, but it is also a bit misleading. Plaintiffs who obtain a reversal of a trial
court dismissal may not ultimately prevail in litigation. They may never obtain a
damages award; in fact, they may lose at the summary judgment stage after remand.
Or, they may lose at trial. Nonetheless, it is true that they obtained a victory in the
appellate court.3 4 Other researchers who have obtained empirical data on appellate
33 For further discussion, see Colker, Windfall, supra note 2, at 104-05.
3 4 A further complication in this definition of success is that both parties sometimes appeal
cases and the appellate court sometimes affirms in part and reverses or remands in part. In such
cases, I personally reviewed the case to see whether it should be categorized as an affirmance or
reversal. The reversal had to be "substantial" for me to include the case in the reversal category.
The hardest cases to characterize were ones in which the judgment for plaintiffwas affirmed but
the award was reduced. I created a special category of reversal for this type of decision which I
report in the various tables that I have prepared.
2001]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
outcomes have used this second definition of success. 35 I will generally use that
definition of success in this article while noting its limitations.
B. ADA Overall Win/Loss Data
Table 1 shows how plaintiffs and defendants fare in appellate decisions available
on Westlaw in ADA employment discrimination cases. Defendants are far more
likely to attain a reversal on appeal than are plaintiffs. Defendants attain a full reversal
in 42% of appellate litigation and obtain a reduction in the damages award in an
additional 17.5% of cases. Plaintiffs, by contrast, obtain a reversal of a pro-defendant
judgment in only 12% of cases.
Table 1:
Judicial Outcome: All Cases
Court of appeals disposition of




affirmed reversed lowered Total
Pro-
Defendant 594 (87.5%) 81 (12%) n/a 675 (94%)
Lower Pro-Ooe Pla f 18(40%) 19 (42%) 8 (17.5%) 45 (6%)Outcome Plaintiff
Total 612 100 8 720
In order to determine if those results are statistically significant, I performed a
Chi-square analysis of the differing rates of reversal for plaintiffs and defendants on
appeals. Reversals were defined as including cases in which the judgment was
affirmed but the award was reduced. Reversal rates for plaintiffs and defendants were
highly significant (p = 0.000). Because the significance level is below 0.001, factors
other than chance should account for the differential success rate for plaintiffs and
defendants on appeal.
When Professor Franklin found a similar trend in defamation litigation, he
concluded that such a differential result was surprising:
35 See Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 32, at 517.
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Although appeals from pretrial interlocutory rulings favorable to plaintiffs might be
unusual, this would not explain the disparity in rates of affirnmnce on the merits. Indeed,
it is often speculated that trial judges generally tend to rule in favor of defendants at
pretrial stages to avoid possibly needless trial and to clear calendars of doubtful cases.
If that were true, one would expect a lower affirnance rate in rulings for defendants than
in cases in which trial judges rule for plaintiffs. 36
Franklin, however, assumes that trial court judges have more of a docket-clearing
motive than appellate court judges so that they would be more likely to render pro-
defendant outcomes than appellate judges. An appellate court judge, however, may
have the same interest in docket-clearing as a trial court judge, thereby making
summary affmances a popular device. Because summary affirmances tend to reflect
affirmances of pro-defendant trial court outcomes, it may not be surprising that the
pro-defendant bias in the trial courts is replicated in the appellate courts as reflected
in Table 2.
Table 2:
Plaintiffs' and Defendants' Relative Success Rates on Appeal
Defendant Plaintiff Success
Success Rate Rate
Jury Verdict 22 of 34 1 of 16 (6.25%)
Bench Trial 2 of 3 0 of 7
Preliminary Injunction 0 of 1 0 of 0
Denial of Preliminary 0of 0of3Injunction0of00f3
Final Injunction I of 1 0 of
Summary Judgment 1 of 2 61 of 540 (11.3%)
Denial of Summary Judgment 0 of 2 0 of 1
Dismissal NA 15 of 88
Denial of Dismissal 0 of 1 NA
Judgment as a Matter of Law 1 of 1 4 of 20
Total 27 of 45 (60%) 81 of 675 (12%)
36 Franklin, Winners and Losers, supra note 30, at 469-70.
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One explanation for the differing success rates between plaintiffs and defendants
on appeal might be that plaintiffs and defendants are appealing different kinds of
decisions, and that defendants have a comparatively more lenient burden of proof.
Table 2 summarizes the legal postures of plaintiffs and defendants cases on appeal
and compares their relative success rates.
Plaintiffs are more likely to be appealing adverse summary judgment motions
and defendants are more likely to be appealing adverse trial court decisions. One
therefore might speculate that it is easier to challenge trial court verdicts than
summaryjudgment decisions. Two factors, however, counsel against that conclusion.
First, when plaintiffs challenge adverse jury decisions, they prevail at a much lower
rate than defendants. So, if it is easier in general to challenge jury verdicts than
summary judgment decisions then why do plaintiffs not benefit from that general
principle? Also, the experience of plaintiffs was exactly the opposite of this
hypothesis. They found it relatively easier to challenge summary judgment decisions
than trial verdicts.
Second, the legal rules would actually appear to favor plaintiffs on appeal, not
defendants, because there are significant legal barriers to challenging jury verdicts.
Their findings of fact must be appealed under a clearly erroneous standard-the
highest burden ofproof created by the law. Moreover, a case often goes to ajury only
after a judge already concluded that summary judgment for the defendant was not
appropriate-that there were genuine issues of fact for the jury to consider and the
defendant was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Challenging that legal
conclusion after ajury verdict-that the defendant was not entitled to judgment as a
matter of law-is similar to seeking to overtum an adverse summary judgment
decision. There is nothing in the rules of law that should make it easier for defendants
to challenge this kind of decision than for plaintiffs to challenge adverse summary
judgment decisions.
Nonetheless, there is one large difference between the plaintiffs' and defendants'
postures on appeal. When the defendant appeals a jury verdict, the court of appeals
typically knows the size of the judgment awarded to the plaintiff. If the large size of
an award positively influences a reversal, then we might expect reversals to be most
likely in the cases with the highest damages awards. Although I coded size of verdict,
I do not have sufficiently complete data to consider this factor at this time. I may
consider it in future work on a later version of this database.
One other difference between plaintiffs and defendants should be considered in
analyzing this data. There are relatively few appeals by defendants in the database.
Of the 720 cases in the database, there are only 45 appeals by defendants. The fact
that there are only 45 appeals by defendants most likely suggests that a winnowing
out process has occurred before the appellate process begins. Because defendants are
usually paying their lawyers on an hourly basis, they may have more financial
incentive to pursue only strong cases. By contrast, once a plaintiff s lawyer has taken
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the financial risk of taking a case to trial, it may seem worthwhile to pursue the
appellate process if a trial outcome is not satisfactory. If the appeal is pro se, then it
is virtually costless to the plaintiff. Even if a plaintiff has retained counsel, the
plaintiff may not incur any additional cost if there is a contingency fee arrangement.
Thus, defendants may be deterred from pursuing appeals by built-in factors that do
not affect plaintiffs. The huge disparity between the number of appeals by plaintiffs
and defendants may reflect these differing incentives.
C. Comparison with Other Areas of the Law
I have compared my ADA data to data from other comparable areas of law to see
if such pro-defendant results are typical in appellate litigation. I used two different
types of data sets to make that comparison. First, I examined the Title VII and ADEA
data that was part of my ADA data. Second, I examined data sets external to my
ADA data-some of this external data was collected by me and some of it was
collected by other researchers.
1. Title VIT and ADEA Data as Part of ADA Data Set
One way to offer a comparison between the ADA and other statutes is to
examine how ADA plaintiffs fare when they allege ADEA or Title VII theories of
discrimination as part of their ADA lawsuit In order to offer this comparison, I relied
exclusively on my ADA database of appellate opinions available on Westlaw. In this
database, I coded the outcome on Title VII and ADEA actions that were a part of the
ADA cases. The overall success rate for Title VII and ADEA did not differ
significantly from the overall success rate for the ADA.
Table 3 displays the Title VII data in my ADA database.
Table 3: Title VII Data in ADA Cases
Title VII claim on appeal?
Yes, and Yes, and
pro-P pro-D
appellate appellate





Total 10 9 80 99
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Of the 89 Title VII claims appealed by plaintiffs or defendants, only 3 (3.4%)
had resulted in pro-plaintiffresults at the trial court level. These three cases were all
affirtmed on appeal. Of the 86 Title VII claims appealed by plaintiffs, plaintiffs
obtained a reversal in 6 cases (6.9%). This result was not significantly different than
the 12% reversal rate I reported in Table 2 for ADA claims.
The ADEA data in my database shows a similar pro-defendant trend. Table 4
reports that data.
Table 4: ADEA Data in ADA Cases
ADEA claim at appellate level?
Yes, and Yes, and
pro-P pro-D
appellate appellate
No disposition disposition Total




Total 5 5 50 60
Of the 55 ADEA claims appealed in my database, only one had resulted in a pro-
plaintiff'judgment at trial. That one case was affirmed on appeal. Plaintiffs prevailed
in 4 of the 54 (7.4%) pro-defendant ADEA outcomes that they appealed. As we saw
in Table 2, plaintiffs prevailed in 12% of the ADA outcomes that they appealed.
Those differences are not statistically significant.
This data suggests that the results in Title VII and ADEA cases are not different
than the results in ADA cases when the Title VII or ADEA theory is presented as part
of the ADA lawsuit. By contrast, as discussed above, Title VII plaintiffs fare much
better than ADA plaintiffs when they bring a claim that is not necessarily part of an
ADA lawsuit.
The contrasting results when Title VII claims are part of an ADA lawsuit and
when they are not is perplexing. It does suggest that the "kitchen sink" approach of
alleging as many theories of discrimination as possible may not be a profitable way
to litigate civil rights cases. Another result is also possible. It may be that judges have
such a strong anti-ADA bias or are so prejudiced against individuals with disabilities
that they look disfavorably on any lawsuit brought by an individual with a disability.
Many disabilities are invisible so that ajudge in a Title VII action might ordinarily not
be aware that a plaintiff has a disability. But when that disability is mentioned as part
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of the pending ADA lawsuit; then the judge becomes aware of the disability in the
Title VII lawsuit
2. Comparison with Data outside My ADA Database
Other researchers have collected data on published decisions in other areas of the
law such as defamation, nonprisoner constitutional tort litigation, prisoner
constitutional tort litigation, and a control group of non-civil-rights litigation. This
data did not include Title VII data for my time period of investigation. I therefore
created a small data set to supplement the data made available by others to compare
ADA data to Title VII data. This data includes only the first six months of 1999. 1
gathered this data from the headnotes of published appellate decisions available on
Westlaw from January 1, 1999 to July 1, 1999. I chose this time frame so that the
ADA and Title VII cases would be covering a comparable period of time. Since
headnotes are available only for published decisions, these are all published decisions.
I found that judicial outcomes under Title VII appear to be much more pro-plaintiff
than published judicial outcomes under the ADA. For this time period, I found that
Title VII plaintiffs obtained reversals in 34 of 100 cases (34%) and defendants
obtained reversals in 12 of 29 cases (41%).
The pro-defendant bias in my database is stronger than the pattern found by
researchers in other fields who have examined published decisions, as reflected in
Table 5. Whereas plaintiffs obtained reversals in only 21% of ADA cases, they
obtained reversals in 34% of Title VII cases, 26% of defamation cases, 38% of
nonprisoner constitutional tort litigation, and 48% of prisoner constitutional tort
litigation.37 Similarly, whereas defendants obtained reversals in 60% of ADA cases,
they obtained reversals in 41% of Title VII cases, 52% of defamation cases, 48% of
nonprisoner constitutional tort cases, and 49% of prisoner constitutional tort cases.
The ADA data looks most comparable to the defamation data, which is somewhat
surprising since the defamation data is from a much earlier time period (1976-1979)
when one might have expected judges to be more liberally disposed towards
plaintiffs. Possibly, liberal judges' biases were constrained by the First Amendment
issues in these cases.
37 A comparison with other areas of the law, however, reflects the limited conclusions that
one can draw from appellate data. The mere fact that a type of case is successful or unsuccessful
at the appellate level does not necessarily reflect its success rate at the trial court level. This
observation is most striking for prisoners' rights litigation. Plaintiffs' success rate at the district
court level is only 18% in prisoner rights cases yet is 48% when plaintiffs appeal pro-defendant
judgments. Plaintiffs prevail in 48% of prisoner rights cases on appeal whereas they prevail in only
38% of nonprisoner constitutional tort cases on appeal. By contrast, at the district court level,
nonprisoner rights claims are successful much more frequently than prisoner rights claims (50%
compared to 18%). Thus, although Table 3 reflects that ADA cases fare worse at the appellate level
than prisoner rights claims, it would be wrong to conclude that ADA cases necessarily fare worse
at the trial court level than prisoner rights claims.
2001)
OHIO STATELAWJOURNVAL
Table 5: Published Appellate Data
Plaintiff Appeals: Defendant Appeals:
% reversed % reversed
ADA Employment
Discrimination Cases38  (64 of 310) 21% (21 of 35) 60%
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 196439  (34 of 100) 34% (12 of29)41%
Defamation Litigation40  (82 of 315) 26% (66 of 126) 52%
Nonprisoner Constitutional Tort
Litigation4' (150 of 395) 38% (43 of 89) 48%
Prisoner Constitutional Tort
Litigation42  (53 of 111) 48% (11 of 16) 69%
Control Group (Non-Civil-
Rights Litigation) 43  (144 of 411) 35% (73 of 222) 33%
The area of law in which I would have expected to find the closest similarity to
the ADA is the Title VII data. Yet the Title VII data is much more pro-plaintiff than
is the ADA data. Plaintiffs obtained reversals in 34% of Title VII cases as compared
to 21% of ADA cases; defendants obtained reversals in 41% of Title VII cases as
compared to 60% of ADA cases. There are many differences between ADA actions
and Title VII actions, which may account for the different outcomes under these two
38 This data reflects the published decisions in my database. Plaintiffs obtained reversals in
64 of 310 cases (20.6%) and defendants obtained reversals in 21 of 35 cases (60%), with 5 of the
21 cases constituting a lowering of the damages award. Based on the descriptive information made
available on the other databases, I assume they included those 5 cases in their reversal category,
because they defined reversal as a reversal of any aspect of the case.
39 Ibis data reflects published Title VII decisions from January 1, 1999, to July 1, 1999. I
gathered this data from the headnotes of published decisions available on Westlaw. Plaintiffs
obtained reversals in 34 of 100 cases (34%) and defendants obtained reversals in 12 of 29 cases
(41%).
40 This data reflects published defamation cases from 1976 to 1979. Professor Marc Franldin
gathered this data. He found that plaintiffs obtained reversals in 82 of 315 cases (26%) and
defendants obtained reversals in 66 of 126 cases (52%). See Franldin, Winners andLosers, supra
note 30, at 455. For additional data, see Marc A. Franldin, Suing Media for Libel: 4 Litigation
Study, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 797.
41 This data reflects published decisions from October 1, 1980, to December 31, 1985, in
three circuits. See Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 32, at 525 (Table III).
42 Id.
43 Id. at 518 fig. 2 & n.53.
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statutes. One important difference is that Title VII actions include reverse
discrimination actions brought by Whites or men on the basis of race or gender
discrimination, respectively. ADA actions, by contrast, can be brought only by
individuals with disabilities. The cases in my database that involve both ADA cases
and Title VII claims do not include any Title VII reverse discrimination cases.
Nonetheless, the reverse discrimination cases are not the predominant type of case in
these Title VII appellate cases.44 Title VII is also a much older statute than the ADA,
so lawyers may have a stronger basis for making rational decisions about their
chances in litigation under Title VII than under the ADA.
This data, of course, does not directly tell us how plaintiffs fare at the trial court
level. Of the cases in my database that resulted in published appellate decisions, only
35 of 345 (10.1%) reflected cases in which plaintiffs prevailed at the trial court level.
Professors Eisenberg and Schwab, however, have been able to compare their
published, appellate court data with actual decisions at the trial court level. Table 6
summarizes their data and lists the only available ADA data that I have:
Table 6: Trial Court Decisions
Actual Trial Trial Court Outcomes
Court That Result in
Outcomes: Published Appellate
Plaintiffs Decisions: Plaintiffs
Prevail at Trial Prevail at Trial
Constitutional Tort Cases
(combined average of prisoner 23% 54%
and nonprisoner)
Control Group (Non-Civil- 56% 61%
Rights cases)
ADA Employment unknown 10%
Discrimination Cases
A view of constitutional tort litigation from a perspective that was limited to
published, appellate decisions would therefore overstate plaintiffs' actual success rate
at the trial court level. In the control group, that trend was true to a much smaller
degree. If this data applied to ADA cases, however, it would suggest that plaintiffs
are prevailing at an extremely small rate at the trial court level.
44 1 informally counted the reverse discrimination cases in the Title VII cases. I only counted
three in a sample of over 100 cases. Thus, the reverse discrimination cases could not be causing
the difference in outcome.
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Of course, this trial court data does not reflect settlements. Eisenberg and Schwab
report that 73% of non-civil-rights cases settle, 45% ofnonprisoner constitutional tort
cases settle, and 17% of prisoner tort cases settle.4 5 It is hard to categorize settlements
as pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant since plaintiffs typically settle for less than they seek
in litigation.
Although I do not have settlement data for the ADA, I do have EEOC charge
data. The EEOC reports that 15.7% of the charges filed under the ADA from 1992
through 2000 resulted in "merit resolutions"46 at the pre-trial stage. That merit
resolution figure, however, includes cases in which they found reasonable cause to
believe that discrimination had occurred but were not able to obtain a successful
conciliation. If the unsuccessful conciliations are taken out of their "merit resolution!'
category, then only 12.2% of all claims filed with the EEOC resulted in a pro-
claimant outcome. It is important to note, however, that the charge data includes cases
that result in "administrative closures" that would include cases in which a claimant
sought a right-to-sue letter without pursuing the formal merit resolution process with
the EEOC. Administrative closures were a substantial part of the charges filed with
the EEOC-31.4% of all charges resulted in administrative closures. Some of these
administrative closure cases may also have settled in advance of litigation, but the
EEOC does not collect that data.
One way to assess the EEOC settlement data would be to consider the subset of
only those cases in which resolution was possible. Of the 149,615 ADA resolutions
that were possible of the charges filed with the EEOC, there was an administrative
closure in 46,938 cases (31.4%).47 Merit resolutions were, therefore, only possible
in 102,677 cases. Of those 102,677 cases, the EEOC reports a merit resolution in
23,529 cases (22.9%). Even if one takes the unsuccessful conciliations out of that
figure, it still leaves 18,349 merit resolutions in 102,677 cases (17.9%). That is
roughly the same figure as Eisenberg found for prisoner tort cases.48 It is much lower,
however, than he found for non-civil-rights cases and non-prisoner constitutional tort
cases.
49
Low settlement figures for claims considered by the EEOC may not be surprising
given that their claimants bear no costs in filing a claim of discrimination. Moreover,
lawyers may seek administrative closure in the strongest cases, because they are eager
to seek a settlement or trial court victory for their client and see little benefit through
45 Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 32, at 532.
46 See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNIY COMM'N, supra note 24.
47 There is some double counting in the EEOC's resolution categories. The 31.4% figure
reported by the EEOC is a percentage of all resolutions, rather than a percentage of all charges.
There were 141,8 10 charges but 149,615 resolutions due to double counting problems. See id.
48 See supra, text accompanying note 45.
4 9 Id.
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their participation in the EEOC's process. 50 According to the EEOC's own data, the
average award for a case in their merit resolution category is $13,406.51 That size
award would not be sufficient to pay a lawyer on an hourly basis or for a lawyer to
earn decent money through a contingency agreement It therefore may be rational for
lawyers to opt out of the EEOC's administrative process rather than to spend months
waiting for an award under $20,000. Of the cases in my data set in which a plaintiff
obtained a successful outcome, the average award was over $100,000. It makes sense
that the cases with potentially high awards are not reflected in the EEOC's settlement
data.
The EEOC process may be filtering out the weak cases so that they do not clog
up the court system. As one group of researchers has noted:
There can be little doubt that many Title I charges are frivolous. It does not follow,
however, that the charge process is failing or even that it is being widely abused. The
administrative charge process is designed to provide a relatively inexpensive and quick
means of resolving disputes between workers and employers. It is very easy for an
employee who suspects discrimination to file a charge, even the employee who lacks
hard evidence to support the claim (as is often the case even in ultimately meritorious
cases). There is no fee, no lawyer is required, and charges can be filed by mail or faxed
to agencies. The initial screening of weak or malicious cases, that in standard litigation
is performed by lawyers and court clerks, comes after filing in the ADA charge system.52
Even so, the filter is not a big one. About 88% of the cases filed with the EEOC
are eligible to become court cases after the issuance of the right-to-sue letter. More
than half of those cases are ones in which the EEOC found no reasonable cause to
believe that discrimination has occurred.53 Without trial court data, it is hard to
speculate on the effectiveness of the EEOC's filtering process.
In sum, plaintiffs appear to fare worse at the trial court and appellate levels under
the ADA than in other areas of the law. For the remainder of this article, I will try to
understand why plaintiffs fare worse under the ADA than under other areas of law.
50 Administrative closure, however, can also be the result of inaction on the part of the EEOC
or the parties rather than action on part of the plaintiff's lawyer. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORUNnY COMM'N, supra note 24.
5 1 See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, Cumulative ADA Monetary
Charge Data-Monetary Benefits, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-monetary.html (last
visited Feb. 19, 2001).
52 Kathryn Moss et al., Different Paths to Justice: The ADA, Employment, andAdministrative
Enforcement by the EEOC and FEPAs, 17 BEHAV. SC L & L. 29, 43 (1999).
53 See supra note 24.
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III. CHANGES OVER TIME
In order to understand why plaintiffs appear to be faring so poorly under the
ADA, I explored several hypotheses. In this section, I will explore one
hypothesis. In the next section, I will explore several hypotheses through
regression analysis.
My first hypothesis was that the ADA is a new statute with new issues,
causing a high rate of reversal during an initial period of judicial uncertainty. In
particular, the pro-plaintiff experience of many civil rights lawyers under CRA
Title VII or the Rehabilitation Act may have caused them to overpredict their
success rate under the ADA. If this hypothesis were correct, then I would expect
the results to become more pro-plaintiff over time as plaintiff lawyers learn to
make better judgments about which claims may be meritorious on appeal. In
other words, they should self-correct for their initial miscalculation. 54 That trend
has not yet begun, possibly because the courts are rendering increasingly pro-
defendant decisions, thereby making it difficult for plaintiffs to make accurate
predictions about the successful nature of their lawsuits.
54 A less charitable way to explain this problem would be to say that plaintiff lawyers
were not competent in the early years of ADA litigation, so that poor lawyering explains the
poor results on appeal. For support of this hypothesis, see Jeffrey A. Van Detta & Dan R.
Gallipeau, Judges and Juries: Why Are So Many ADA Plaintiffs Losing Summary Judgment
Motions, and Would They Fare Better Before a Jury? A Response to Professor Colker, 19
REV. LmiG. 505, 574 (2000):
[T]he problem appears largely to arise from lawyering that does not take into account the
regulations, interpretation, and guidance in developing the theory of the case, planning and
executing discovery, and effectively presenting sufficient probative evidence on key
elements of the claim-particularly the existence of a disability-to survive summary
judgment.
If Van Detta and Gallipeau are correct that poor lawyering explains some of these
adverse results, one still must wonder why these results have not self-corrected over time.
Lawyers who do not prevail under the ADA will rarely receive significant compensation,
given the prevalence of contingency fee arrangements in civil rights cases. One would expect
that adverse results would have a filtering effect on lawyers' judgments even if it did not
improve the quality of their lawyering.
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Table 7 reports the results over time from August 3, 1994, to July 26, 1999.
Table 7: ADA Appellate Outcomes: 1994-1999
Year Frequency of Pro- Percentage
Defendant Results
1994 5 of 6 83%
1995 35 of 42 83%
1996 96 of 114 84%
1997 158 of 178 89%
1998 189 of 219 86%
1999 140 of 161 87%
Total 623 of 720 87%
The level of pro-defendant outcomes has remained relatively constant since
1996. It therefore does not appear that the ADA is currently experiencing a period of
fluctuations in appellate judicial outcomes. It has achieved a stable, although highly
pro-defendant, rate ofjudicial outcomes.55
One explanation for this consistent, pro-defendant outcome in the early years of
litigation is that plaintiffs have unrealistically high expectations for the ADA, and are
therefore pursuing nonmeritorious litigation. I was interested to see if this purported
problem also occurred in the early years of Title VII enforcement. Interestingly, I
found exactly the opposite pattem under Title VII. I constructed a database with the
early years of Title VII appellate cases that are available on Westlaw. I coded 105
cases from May 3, 1967, through December 31, 1972. These decisions were
overwhelmingly pro-plaintiff. These results were also relatively stable over this time
period.
55 The American Bar Association has also surveyed ADA employment discrimination cases
since 1992. Their methodology includes all available ADA decisions, including district court and
Supreme Court. Their methodology would also appear to include some double counting-a case
might be counted at the trial court, appellate court, and Supreme Court level. Because reported
district court decisions are most likely to be summaryjudgnents, their methodology produces more
pro-defendant decisions than if one only examines appellate results. Thus, the ABA reports that
the overall employer win rate is 91.6% from 1992 to 1997, a somewhat higher figure than I report.
Interestingly, the ABA has found that the employer win rate under their methodology has risen in
the last two years. They report a 94.4% employer win rate for 1998 and a 95.7% employer win rate
for 1999. See John W. Parry, Highlights & Trends: 1999 Employment Decisions Under the ADA
Title I-Survey Update, 24 MENTAL& PHYSICALDiSABiLrrY L. REP. 348, 349 (2000).
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Table 8: Title VII Appellate Outcomes: 1967-1972
Year Frequency of Pro- Percentage
Defendant Results
1967 2 of 2 100%
1968 0 of 3 0%
1969 3 of 15 20%
1970 3 of 15 20%
1971 5 of 27 18.5%
1972 12 of 43 28%
Total 25 of 105 24%
This comparative data suggests that judicial attitude towards a statute may be the
most important predictor of litigation results. In the early years of Title VII
enforcement, it appears that the appellate judges were often rendering more pro-
plaintiff interpretations than the trial courts. That result can be seen in Table 9.
Table 9: Title VII Appellate Results: 1967-1972
Trial Court Appellate Court Appellate Court Total
Outcome Outcome Affirmed Outcome Reversed
Pro-Defendant 20 63 83
Pro-Plaintiff 17 5 22
Total 37 68 105
The 80 results that I characterized as pro-plaintiff were the 63 reversals of pro-
defendant trial court decisions and the 17 affirmances of pro-plaintiff trial court
decisions. The appellate courts reversed 63 of 83 (76%) of the pro-defendant trial
court decisions and reversed only 5 of 22 (23%) of the pro-plaintiff trial court
decisions. Given the high rate of reversal of pro-defendant trial court outcomes, I
would characterize the appellate courts as more pro-plaintiff than the trial courts.
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The ADA results are exactly the opposite, as reflected in Table 10.
Table 10: ADA Appellate Results: 1994-1999
Trial Court Appellate Court Appellate Court Total
Outcome Outcome Affirmed Outcome Reversal
Pro-Defendant 594 91 675
Pro-Plaintiff 17 28 45
Total 611 109 720
In the ADA cases, the appellate courts reversed only 91 of 675 (13%) of cases
in which the trial court had rendered a pro-defendant result By contrast, they reversed
28 of 45 (62%) of cases in which the trial court had rendered a pro-plaintiff result.
Thus, I would characterize the appellate courts as more pro-defendant than the trial
courts.
A question that I would like to investigate in further research is when did the
Title VII results become less pro-plaintiff? A preliminary investigation that I have
conducted of recent Title VII cases suggests that Title VII appellate results are
currently pro-defendant, although somewhat less pro-defendant than ADA cases.5 6
IfI could code the cases decided between 1972 and 1998, it would be interesting to
learn when the shift from pro-plaintiff to pro-defendant results occurred.
From the limited data that I have available at this time, however, some
preliminary observations are warranted. First, it is clear that the appellate court docket
has grown enormously since Title VII was passed in 1964. There are only 105 cases
in my Title VII database whereas there are 720 cases in my ADA database for the first
eight years of the respective statutes. It is true that Westlaw included few unpublished
decisions from the time period between 1964 and 1972; however, even if I limit
myself to published decisions, there is a huge disparity between Title VII and ADA
litigation. There were 310 published ADA appellate decisions as compared to about
100 published Title VII decisions in the statutes' first eight years.
By contrast, the Supreme Court appears to have played a more immediate and
significant role in the development of Title VII than in the development of the ADA.
Of the 105 cases in my Title VII database, ten of them had a "red flag" in Westlaw,
meaning that the result was reversed, in whole or in part, on appeal. While the
appellate court docket has swelled in the last several decades, the Supreme Court's
docket has contracted. Although the Supreme Court has been comparatively active
in considering ADA cases (as compared to other kinds of cases), it has rendered only
56 See Table 5, supra p. 254 (reporting Title VII cases from January 1, 1999 to July 1, 1999)
& Table 8, supra, p. 260 (reporting Title VII cases from 1967 to 1972).
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seven decisions that affect ADA Title I since 1990.57 The appellate courts have a
greater opportunity today than they did several decades ago to decide numerous cases
before the Supreme Court renders many decisions interpreting a new statute. It
therefore may be more possible for appellate outcomes to be unpredictable in the
early years of a statute since comparatively fewer rules of law will have been settled
by the Supreme Court.58
But that explanation is problematic in the current political climate. If the
Supreme Court, for example, were more liberal than the appellate courts, then one
might expect litigants to pursue cases even though they assessed their chances in the
appellate courts to be poor, if they thought they might get a more receptive audience
in the Supreme Court. But, in fact, the opposite result is true. The appellate courts, on
average, have been more liberal than the Supreme Court on ADA cases. For example,
the overwhelming majority of appellate courts had accepted a broader definition of
"disability" than was eventually accepted by the Supreme Court.59 Although the
Supreme Court has rendered some pro-plaintiff decisions under the ADA,60 lawyers
in practice in all but the Fourth Circuit would probably be inclined to conclude that
their chances of success are better before the lower courts than before the Supreme
Court.
Another explanation for my data is that ADA plaintiffs are facing a moving
target They may have initially miscalculated their chances of prevailing in the lower
57 See Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999) (holding that employer was not
required to justify adherence to federal regulation when a waiver was available); Cleveland v.
Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999) (holding that employee's receipt of Social Security
benefits did not preclude bringing an ADA claim where an adequate explanation was offered);
Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (holding that employer's conduct need
not be egregious to justify recovery ofpunitive damages); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527
U.S. 516 (1999) (finding that employee failed to demonstrate substantial limitation of one or more
major life activities); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (finding employee not
disabled within meaning of statute); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (holding HIV
infection was a "disability" under ADA even though it has not progressed to the so-called
symptomatic phase); and Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp.,525 U.S. 70 (1998) (finding
collective bargaining agreement arbitration clause did not require employee to use the procedure
for alleged ADA violation).
58 The appellate courts, themselves, are also being less forthcoming in developing rules of
law to guide future litigation because of their increasing tendency to decide unpublished decisions.
According to Professors Merritt and Brudney, nearly 80% of all dispositions on the merits are
unpublished. See Merritt & Brudney, supra note 29, at 72.
591Te First, Third, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits had adopted a broad
definition of disability, whereas, only the Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits had adopted a more
narrow definition. See Colker, Windfall, supra note 2, at 153 (summarizing cases). In Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), the Supreme Court adopted the more narrow
definition, affirming the Tenth Circuit's position.
60 See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (holding that HIV infection can be
covered under the ADA).
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courts, based on their positive experience with disability discrimination claims
under the Rehabilitation Act. When it became clear that the courts were narrowly
interpreting the ADA, they may have adjusted their expectations and made more
conservative decisions about litigation. But the tenor of the courts' decisions
became even more pro-defendant, so that they had not properly adjusted far
enough in a pro-defendant direction.61
I have some empirical support for this hypothesis from Rehabilitation Act
data. I instructed a team of coders to code appellate cases under sections 501,
503, or 504 of the Rehabilitation Act involving employment discrimination
issues.62 The team coded cases in the time period 1981-1992 so that I could
assess the perspective of a lawyer who was experienced with disability
discrimination lawsuits on the eve of the enforcement of ADA Title 1.63 The
team coded whether the trial court and appellate court outcomes in these cases
were pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant. Their results suggest that a lawyer who read
the available decisions on Westlaw would learn that defendants were successful
in the appellate courts about 65% of the time. Table 11 summarizes those results
over time.
61 The Supreme Court's first major ADA decision in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624
(1998), in which it held that individuals with infectious diseases, like HIV infection, could
be considered to be disabled under the ADA may have actually misled plaintiffs into
expecting a liberal interpretation of the ADA from the Supreme Court. With the series of
conservative decisions from 1999, we may still see a period of miscalculation by plaintiffs
in which they lose in the appellate courts as those courts seek to implement the Supreme
Court's narrow definition of disability.
62 In order to create a data set comparable to the ADA data set, we included only cases
decided on the merits, involving issues that could also arise under the ADA. We therefore
did not include cases involving statute of limitations or attorneys fees issues (since those
kinds of cases had also not been included in the ADA data). We also did not include cases
involving jurisdictional or coverage issues such as whether the defendant received federal
financial assistance and was thereby covered under section 504. Because receipt of federal
financial assistance is not a requirement for coverage under the ADA, these cases were not
parallel to the ADA cases in the database.
63 ADA Title I became effective on July 26, 1992.
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Table 11: Rehabilitation Act Appellate Outcomes: 1981-1992
Year Frequency of Pro- Percentage
Defendant Results
1981 2of4 50%
1982 1 of 4 25%
1983 3 of 4 75%
1984 1 of 1 100%
1985 5 of6 83%
1986 5 of 5 100%
1987 3 of 5 60%
1988 6of9 67%
1989 1 of 3 33%
1990 7of 11 64%
1991 11 of 17 65%
1992 7 of 11 64%
Total 52 of 80 65%
The pro-defendant success rate on appeal under the Rehabilitation Act is
considerably lower than it is under the ADA. As reflected in Table 7, the pro-
defendant success rate on appeal under the ADA has remained consistently at 87%
throughout the period under investigation. I have also coded whether the ADA cases
in my database were also section 504 cases. The ADA cases that are also section 504
cases in my database fare the same rate of success on appeal as the non-section 504
ADA cases--87% pro-defendant. I will be collecting more section 504 data in the
future to determine the fate of all section 504 cases after the passage of the ADA.
Was passage of the ADA, in fact, hamfful to the Rehabilitation Act by decreasing the
overall likelihood of success for plaintiffs on appeal in Rehabilitation Act cases?
Until the case law under the ADA becomes more stable and consistent over time,
plaintiffs may find themselves adjusting to a moving target. It is inconceivable that
non-pro se plaintiffs could continue to miscalculate their chances to such a large
extent in litigation. The CRA Title VII data shows that massive adjustments can occur
over time (application of the statute has evolved from pro-plaintiff to pro-defendant
over time in the appellate courts). The conditions for a major adjustment, however,
have not yet occurred under the ADA, because of the lag time between a Supreme
Court decision and lower court litigation. The current ADA cases will have been filed
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before the Supreme Court's decisions on the definition of disability. It will take
several years for a new generation of cases to be filed that have incorporated these
new sets of rules. By then, however, the Supreme Court may have rendered other
conservative decisions that the plaintiff bar has not yet anticipated. Thus, the predicate
to "rational litigation" may not yet exist for the plaintiff bar.64
IV. REGRESSION ANALYSIS
A. General Results
Having rejected my first hypothesis-that the ADA's status as a new statute
explains the high pro-defendant outcomes---I then turned to other hypotheses that I
could assess through regression analysis. In order to ascertain those factors, I coded
various factors in my database of ADA appellate outcomes.65 These factors related
to various hypotheses that I had about ADA outcomes. My coding sheet is attached
as Appendix A.
First, I coded background information about the origin of the cases including the
appellate court in which the litigation took place.66 Second, I coded the plaintiff's
occupation to determine if, for example, blue collar workers fared worse under the
statute than management employees. For these purposes, I used occupational
classifications created by the United States military with one exception. I added the
category "law enforcement" because I observed that there were a significant number
of cases with plaintiffs in that occu-pation. 67 I coded defendant characteristics by
coding whether the defendant was public or private. Third, I coded the type of
disability alleged by the plaintiff. I wanted to see if individuals with uncontroversial
disabilities, such as mobility impairments or hearing impairments, fared better than
individuals with controversial disabilities such as back impairments or HIV infection.
I used the EEOC's disability categories for this coding so that I also could observe
how representative appellate cases are of cases originally filed with the EEOC. Are
certain types of disabilities more likely to result in appellate litigation? Fourth, I coded
the theory of disability alleged by the plaintiff. I was particularly interested in seeing
64 The ABA's most recent data supports this view. The ABA data suggests that the lower
courts are adjusting to recent conservative Supreme Court decisions by rendering results that are
increasingly pro-defendant. See EQUALEMPLOYMENTOPPORTUNIT COMM'N, supra note 50.
65 1 used SPSS to enter this data. I conducted the logistic regression analysis that is reported
in this article in SPSS. My research assistant also conducted these analyses in Stata Release 6.0.
For further discussion of the use of regression analysis in legal scholarship, see Merritt & Brudney,
supra note 29, at 79-84.
66 The Fifth Circuit, a circuit with a moderate position on the mitigating measures issue
during this time period, served as the reference category for the other eleven circuit court variables.
See Washington v. HCA Health Serv., Inc., 152 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 1998).
67 1 used the category "white collar" as the reference category for the occupational variables.
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if individuals with reasonable-accommodation allegations fared worse than
individuals who alleged an unlawful discharge. Finally, I coded whether EEOC
participation in a lawsuit was a significant factor in predicting a successful outcome.
EEOC participation could take two forms-participation as a party or participation
as an amicus.
There were three factors that I was fairly certain would predict appellate outcome
and therefore are contained in the regression model: lower court outcome, whether
a party is appealing a verdict, and whether the plaintiff is proceeding pro se. The
lower court outcome variable reflects whether the plaintiff or defendant won at trial.
Because appellate courts most typically affirm trial court outcomes, it was important
that I control for the result at trial. Otherwise, I would be overstating the tendency of
appellate judges to render pro-defendant results, since the trial court results in my
database were overwhelmingly pro-defendant. The verdict variable reflects the type
of decision from which the party is appealing. The verdict variable was coded as a "1"
for pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant jury verdict, pro-plaintiff or pre-defendant bench
trial, pro-plaintiffpreliminary injunction, and pro-plaintiff final injunction. It is coded
"0" for all other outcomes. This variable reflects, as discussed in Part I of this paper,
that the rules of law make it particularly difficult to overtum verdicts. Thus, I would
expect a "verdict" outcome at trial to predict an unsuccessful appeal. Finally, the pro
se variable reflects whether a party appealed the trial court outcome on a pro se basis.
It is common knowledge that pro se plaintiffs are rarely successful in the appellate
courts. The fact that an attorney has not been willing to take those cases for
compensation may even suggest that many of those cases are frivolous. Hence, I
would expect pro se outcome to predict an unsuccessful appeal. By having each of
these three factors in my regression analysis, I was able to control for their effect on
appellate outcome.
Table 12 reflects the regression results in a logistic regression analysis in which
appellate outcome is the dependent variable. A pro-defendant outcome on appeal is
a "0" and a pro-plaintiff outcome is a "1." Therefore, a positive coefficient means that
the factor correlates with a pro-plaintiff outcome on appeal. If that coefficient is
significant (or approaching significance), the asterisk indicates the degree of
significance.68
68 Social scientists typically designate results with a p-value of 0.05 or less as "significant."
For general discussion of the use of social science techniques as applied to data involving legal
issues, see Deborah Jones Merritt, Research and Teaching on Law Faculties: An Empirical
Exploration, 73 CI. KENT. L. REV. 765,780-82 (1998). It is also common for social scientists to
discuss a p-value that is greater than 0.05 but less than 0.10 as "approaching significance." See id.
at 782 n.59. "It is appropriate to note such relationships in exploratory studies like the present one,
although such results should be taken as suggestive rather than established." Id.
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Table 12: Factors that Affect Appellate Outcome of






Theories of Disability7" .087.0
Actually Disabled .1016
Record of Disability -.1445
Regarded as Disabled .0093
Not Disabled .9304
Major Life Activity, non-work .2324
Major Life Activity, work -.5266




Harassment(Hostile Work Environment -.7843
Failure to H-ire .2690
Medical Exams .2218
Failure to Promote .1368
Otherwise Qualified/Essential .4586
Functions
69 In this regression analysis, I used the category of pro-defendant nonverdict as the reference
category for the other lower court outcomes, because pro-defendant nonverdict was the most
common lower court outcome. The variable that is the reference category must be excluded from
the regression equation.
70 Because a plaintiff could be coded as having alleged more than one of these theories of
disability, it was not necessary to have an excluded variable for comparison purposes.
71 Because a plaintiff could allege more than one of these theories of discrimination, it was
not necessary to have an excluded variable for comparison purposes.
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Variable Coefficient
Reasonable Accommodation .1081
Failure to Reinstate .5014
Retaliation -.0435
Suspension or Involuntary Leave .5513
(Temporary)
Terms and Conditions (Monetary) -.0536
Terms and Conditions (Non-Monetary) -.1557
Defenses Alleged 72
Judicial Estoppel .7328
No Knowledge of Disability -.5684
Direct Threat to Health/Safety of -.6163
Others















72 Because a defendant could allege more than one of these defenses, it was not necessary
to have an excluded variable for comparison purposes.
73 Because a plaintiff could allege more than one of these theories of impairment, it was not
necessary to have an excluded variable for comparison purposes.
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74 The excluded circuit for comparison purposes is the Sixth Circuit. I chose this circuit
because it is a relatively typical circuit in terms of whether its decisions are pro-Plaintiff. It also has
a typical publication practice.
7 5 The excluded occupational status for comparison purposes is "Other white collar." I chose
this category because it was one of the largest categories and appeared to have results that were
typical for the data set as a whole.
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Other Factors
EEOC as Amicus 2.0238***
EEOC as Participant .8531




* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p <. 01, two-tailed tests
B. Analysis
1. Lower Court Outcome
Many of the factors that I coded were statistically significant As expected, a pro-
plaintiff outcome at trial strongly correlated with a pro-defendant outcome on appeal.
The coefficient for pro-plaintiff verdict is higher than the coefficient for pro-plaintiff
nonverdict, meaning that a pro-plaintiff verdict has a higher probability of resulting
in success for the plaintiff on appeal than as pro-plaintiffnonverdict That result can
be summarized in a predicted probability table.
One way to understand the significance of the regression analysis is to conduct
a predicted probabilities analysis. For the purpose of this analysis, we shall assume
a typical ADA case: an individual who alleges to be actually disabled brings a claim
of a discriminatory discharge. Let us further assume that his disability is a back injury,
that he lives in the Sixth Circuit, that he lost his case in the trial court on a grant of
summary judgment or dismissal to the defendant. Finally, let us assume that the
EEOC has not chosen to participate in the case on appeal and that the plaintiff is a
blue collar worker. I have chosen these characteristics because they are some of the
most common variables in the database. A predicted probabilities analysis will allow
us to ask how his chances of success change when we change one or more of these
variables.76 What if he has diabetes rather than a back injury? What if he lives in the
76 In understanding predicted probabilities, however, one must consider them in relationship
to the regression results. The results from a predicted probability analysis are reliable only if the
variable under study is significant in predicting judicial outcome. Otherwise, the predicted
probability result might be due to chance, rather than due to a real relationship between the variable
under study and outcome. For example, blood disorders (such as H1V) infection did not correlate
significantly with appellate outcome in the regression equation. The predicted probability analysis
reveals that individuals with blood disorders could be predicted to do less well in appellate
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Fourth Circuit rather than the Sixth Circuit? What if there had been an adverse jury
verdict rather than grant of summary judgment? And what if the EEOC intervened
as an amicus in the court of appeal?
In Table 13, I ask how the predicted probability of plaintiff success changes
depending on the outcome at trial.





In the "profile" case, a plaintiff has a 2.8% chance of prevailing if he or she
appeals a pro-defendant non-verdict. The chance ofplaintiffprevailing rises to 5.0%
if the plaintiff is defending a defendant appeal of a pro-plaintiff non-verdict. The
chance ofplaintiffprevailing rises to 8.5% if the plaintiff is defending a defendant-
appeal of a pro-plaintiff verdict.
Another way to consider this data, however, is to recognize that plaintiffs have
a 91.5% chance of losing on appeal, even when they are defending a verdict. Because
verdicts are the easiest type of judgment to defend on appeal, these results
demonstrate how difficult it is for plaintiffs to prevail on the ADA cases in this
database.
2. Theory ofDisability
The theory of disability was not a significant factor in predicting appellate
outcome. It did not matter whether plaintiff alleged that he or she was actually
disabled or regarded as disabled in predicting appellate outcome.
3. Type ofDiscrimination Alleged
The type of discrimination that was alleged was a significant factor in predicting
appellate outcome. A plaintiff who alleged a discriminatory demotion was
significantly more likely to prevail than other plaintiffs. Table 14 reflects the predicted
probabilities for different allegations of discrimination.
litigation than individuals with back injuries but that result may be spurious, because blood
disorders were not statistically significant. By contrast, EEOC participation as an amicus was a
highly significant factor in predicting appellate outcome. The predicted probability result is
therefore a very useful statement of how much change in outcome can be expected when the
EEOC participates as an amicus.
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Failure to hire .037
Medical exams .036
Failure to promote .033
Otherwise qualified .045
Reasonable accommodation .032
Failure to reinstate .047
Retaliation .028
Suspension/Involuntary Leave .049
Terms and conditions (monetary) .027
Terms and conditions (non-monetary) .025
As this table reflects, plaintiffs who alleged a discriminatory demotion had a
13.2% chance of prevailing whereas plaintiffs alleging other forms of discrimination
had between a 1.3% and 4.9% chance of prevailing. Although harassment claims had
the lowest predicted probability (reflecting their high negative coefficient in the
regression analysis), that result was not statistically significant. Nonetheless, of the 24
cases in the database in which plaintiff alleged harassment plaintiffs were successful
in only 2 of them (8.3%). By contrast of the 19 cases in the database in which
plaintiff alleged a demotion, plaintiffs were successful in 5 of them (26.3%). With a
larger database, it is possible that one might find that harassment claims correlated
significantly with lack of success on the part of a plaintiff.
The demotion data is somewhat surprising. It is certainly reasonable to expect
people who hold jobs to fare better in discrimination cases than individuals who are
merely seeking to be hired. Thus, I would have expected failure to hire cases to fare
worse than demotion cases. But if holding ajob is a positive factor in a discrimination
claim, then discharge claims should also have been more successful than other types
of cases. An allegation of an unlawful discharge, however, was not a significant factor
in predicting a pro-plaintiff result. In fact although the results are not statistically
significant the coefficient for the discharge factor was negative. Were I to combine
discharge and demotion into a single factor, the new factor-loss of job status-
would not be significant.
It is possible that plaintiffs who allege a demotion rather than an outright
discharge are viewed more favorably by the courts, because they appear to be more
qualified for employment. Alternatively, it is possible that my demotion result is a
spurious result in the data set that will disappear over time.
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4. Defenses
No statistical significance was found for the defenses that were raised by the
defendant Thus, I did not conduct a predicted probabilities analysis on that data.
5. Type oflimpairment
The type of physical or mental impairment was found to be statistically
significant. Plaintiffs who alleged that they had an impairment due to diabetes or
extremities impairments77 were more likely to prevail than other plaintiffs.

















The plaintiffs with extremities impairments had a wide variety of problems
ranging from arthritis to amputated limbs. Those cases, however, did not include mere
back injuries and may therefore have seemed like more sympathetic cases to judges
on appeal. (Back impairments are the most commonly alleged impairment under the
ADA and subject to the common questions about unverifiable soft tissue injuries that
7 7 Extremities impairments included missing limbs or digits; hand, arm, or shoulder
impairments (without paralysis); and arthritis. There was a separate category for back or orthopedic
impairments, as well as a separate category for paralysis.
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one sees in tort and worker compensation cases.) This data preceded the Supreme
Court's recent decisions narrowing the definition of disability. Those cases are likely
to have an influence on diabetes cases so it will be interesting to see if this trend
continues over time.
The predicted probability table also reflects that plaintiffs who allege substance
abuse impairments have only a 0.5% chance of'prevailing as compared to the profile
case with a 2.8% chance of prevailing. Those results, however, were not statistically
significant and are therefore not reliable.
6. Circuit
The circuit in which the plaintiff litigated was also a highly significant factor. As
the table shows, the D.C., Second, and Third Circuits were significantly more likely
to produce pro-plaintiff results than the Sixth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit was
significantly more likely to produce pro-defendant results than the Sixth Circuit The
Third Circuit results, however, may have been affected by its notoriously low
publication rate.78 Table 16 compares publication rates by circuits in my database.
Table 16: Publication Practice By Circuit
Circuit Published Unpublished Total
D.C. Cir. 4 5 9
1st Cir. 22 2 24
2nd Cir. 14 30 44
3rd Cir. 18 18
4th Cir. 16 85 101
5th Cir. 49 49
6th Cir. 28 76 104
7th Cir. 73 25 98
8th Cir. 49 17 66
9th Cir. 23 78 101
10th Cir. 24 57 81
11th Cir. 25 25
Total 345 375 720
78 See Merritt & Brudney, supra note 29, at 78 n.70.
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Not only does the Third Circuit not make its unpublished decisions available to
the public but it publishes relatively few opinions. As discussed earlier, published
decisions tend to be more pro-plaintiff than unpublished decisions. Because the Third
Circuit does not make its unpublished decisions available to electronic services and
publishes a comparatively small percentage of its decisions, its appellate results are
skewed in a pro-plaintiff direction as compared to the other circuits. Table 17 reports
the predicted probabilities for the circuits.













These results suggest that a plaintiff's predicted probability is highest in the D.C.
Circuit and lowest in the Fourth Circuit ranging from 15.7% to 0.3%. The Fourth
Circuit result is consistent with the widespread media coverage about the conservative
nature of the Fourth Circuit decisions.
7. Plaintiff's Occupation
Plaintiff's occupation was not a significant factor in predicting appellate
outcome. I have considered coding the size of the defendant to see if factors about the
defendant may predict appellate outcome. At this time, however, I have not found a
useful methodology for coding the size of defendants. I did code whether the
defendant was a public or private entity, that factor was not significant in predicting
appellate outcome.
2001]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
I did conduct a predicted probabilities analysis of occupation. Surprisingly,









Other White Collar 0.022
Those results, however, are not statistically significant.
8. EEOC Participation as Amicus
The only one of the factors that is surprising in the regression analysis is the
correlation between EEOC amicus participation and pro-plaintiff results. In a
previous article, I documented the second class status that has been accorded EEOC
regulations under civil rights statutes.7 9 The trilogy of decisions in 1999 confirmed
those results. Thus, it may be surprising that EEOC participation as amicus would be
a helpful rather than hurtful signal for plaintiffs. Of course, it is possible that EEOC
participation did not cause the pro-plaintiff outcome; the EEOC simply happened to
choose to participate in cases that were already likely to yield pro-plaintiff results. It
is also interesting to note that EEOC participation as a party did not significantly
correlate with a pro-plaintiff outcome. That result may be due to the fact that there
were only 8 cases in the database in which the EEOC participated as a party, thereby
making it difficult to find statistical significance. By contrast, there were 42 cases in
which the EEOC participated as an amicus. With more data, I may find that EEOC's
status as a party is a significant factor. Alternatively, the prejudice against the EEOC
limits the degree to which they can be effective in a lawsuit Thus, EEOC
participation as an amicus may be more acceptable to some judges than EEOC
participation as a party.
79 See Colker, Windfall, supra note 2, at 137-50.
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Table 19 shows the predicted probabilities when the EEOC participates as an
amicus.
Table 19: EEOC Amicus?
Yes 0.180
No 0.028
Plaintiff's predicted success rate increased from 2.8% to 18.0% when the EEOC
intervenes as an amicus.
V. CONCLUSION
My analysis of appellate decisions under the ADA suggests that defendants are
much more likely than plaintiffs to prevail in appellate litigation. Although defendant
success rates are generally higher than plaintiff success rates in other comparable
areas of the law, the results under the ADA are more pro-defendant than has been
found by other researchers. When ADEA and Title VII issues are part of ADA
litigation, however, these other causes of action also fare quite poorly. It is only when
Title VII cases are brought independently from ADA cases that they fare better than
ADA cases. These comparative results suggest that there is something distinctive
about ADA litigation that accounts for these disparate pro-defendant results.
It is possible to account for judicial outcomes by saying that plaintiffs are making
poor decisions about which cases to litigate and appeal. (The EEOC, however,
appears to be using its resources effectively in deciding which cases in which to
participate as an amicus.) Over time, however, one would expect the plaintiff bar to
respond to the statistical reality of the unlikeliness of prevailing. With contingency fee
awards the predominant method of compensation, plaintiff lawyers have a very strong
incentive to make conservative judgments about litigation.
One factor that may be causing the plaintiffbar to overpredict judicial outcomes
is that ADA cases appear to be faring much worse than Title VII litigation. ADA
appellate outcomes under the ADA are also much more pro-defendant than were
appellate outcomes under the Rehabilitation Act on the eve of the effective data of the
ADA. The litigation assumptions that these lawyers may be making based on their
Title VII experience may not be applicable to the ADA.
It is also possible that plaintiff lawyers simply do not yet fully understand the
legal requirements of the ADA. To the extent that cases lose because of the distinctive
features of the ADA-like the reasonable accommodation requirement and the
definition of disability-that hypothesis may make sense. But my data does not
support that hypothesis, because reasonable accommodation cases do not fare worse
than other kinds of ADA cases.
2001]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
I also tried to determine which factors in litigation may predict judicial outcome.
The significant factors included EEOC participation as amicus, pro se status, trial
court outcome, D.C. Circuit Second Circuit and Third Circuit. There was a trend
toward significance in the First and Ninth Circuits. The Third Circuit result may
reflect a narrow decision about what kinds of cases to make available to the public
rather than an overall pro-plaintiff bias. There was a trend toward diabetes and
extremities disabilities predicting pro-plaintiff outcomes on appeal. EEOC
participation as an amicus was a very strong factor in predicting a pro-plaintiff
outcome on appeal.
In general, it is very difficult to paint a precise picture of what factors are
significant in predicting winning or losing ADA litigation, because many decisions
are per curiam and provide researchers with few facts about the case or outcome.
Although my database contains 720 cases, only a few hundred of the cases have
sufficient data to lend themselves to close analysis. With more data, I should be able
to paint a fuller picture in the future.
The most sobering hypothesis that emerges from this data is that the enactment
of the ADA may have greatly harmed plaintiffs' prospects under a related disability
statute-the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. On the eve of the effective date of ADA Title
I, Rehabilitation Act plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases were faring twice
as successfully as would ADA plaintiffs over the next decade. This hypothesis will
be the topic of my future consideration of the ADA.80
80 1 will be exploring that possibility further in an ADA symposium at the University of
Michigan Law School on November 3-4,2000, and in my paper for that symposium. See Ruth
Colker, The Death of Section 504, U. OF MICH. J.L. REFORM (forthcoming 2001).
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APPENDIX
ADA CODING SHEET
CODER- DATE: I I
(INITIALS) (MONTH, DAY, YEAR).
CASE ID: _ I I






DOCKET NO: -_ ____
APPEALS CT. CITATION:







































STATUS AT COURT OF APPEALS
PRO-PLAINTIFF PRO-DEFENDANT
(1) Jury Verdict (11) Jury Verdict
(2) Bench Trial (12) Bench Trial
(3) Prelim. Injunction (13) Prelim. Injunction
(4) Final Injunction (14) Final Injunction
(5) Summary Judgment (15) Summary Judgment
(6) Denial of Sum. Judgment (16) Denial of Sum. Judgment
(7) Denial of Dismissal (17) Dismissal
(8) J. as a Matter of Law (18) J. as a Matter of Law
(9) Other/Arbitration (19) Other/Arbitration
(99) non-ascertainable
(1) Decided by panel for first time
(2) Decided by panel after granting
reconsideration
(3) Decided by panel after remand
from Supreme Court.
(4) Decided by court en bane








(3) Federal Agency for P
(4) Federal Agency for D
(5) Intervenor





(3) Both Private and Public
INTERVENORS
(0) No/None
(1) Yes, for Plaintiff
(2) Yes, for Defendant






















(4) Other white collar








EEOC REGULATIONS EEOC GUIDANCE MITIGATING MEASURES
(0) Not Cited (0) Not Cited (0) Not Cited
(1) Cited & Disregarded (1) Cited & Disregarded (1) Cited & Disregarded
(2) Cited & Followed (2) Cited & Followed (2) Cited & Followed
COLL. BARGAINING HEALTH INS. SUBTERFUGE OTHER REGS/GUIDANCE CITED
(0) Not Cited (0) Not Cited (0) No
(1) Cited & Disregarded (1) Cited & Disregarded (1) Yes;
(2) Cited & Followed (2) Cited & Followed
NON-ADA TREATMENT
ADEA (TRIAL) ADEA (APPEAL) TITLE VII (TRIAL) TITLE VII (APPEAL)
(0) No (0) No (0) No (0) No
(1) Yes, Pro-P (1) Yes, Pro-P (1) Yes, Pro-P (1) Yes, Pro-P
(2) Yes, Pro-D (2) Yes, Pro-D (2) Yes, Pro-D (2) Yes, Pro-D
ADA TITLE II ADA TITLE II
NON-EMPLOY NON-EMPLOY ADA TITLE III
(TRIAL) (APPEAL) ADA TITLE III (TRIAL) (APP)
(0) No (0) No (0) No (0) No
(1) Yes, Pro-P (1) Yes, Pro-P (1) Yes, Pro-P (1) Yes, Pro-P
(2) Yes, Pro-D (2) Yes, Pro-D (2) Yes, Pro-D (2) Yes, Pro-D
OTHER NON-ADA CLAIM
(0) No
(1) Yes STATE; FMLA; ERISA; 504
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ADA TREATMENT
TREATMENT OF LOWER COURT'S ADA DECISION:
(0) Stay, Petition or Motion Granted
(I) Affirmed (includes affirmed and petition denied)
(2) Reversed (includes reversed and vacated and remanded)
(3) Petition Denied or Appeal Dismissed
(4) Certification to Another Court
(99) non-ascertainable
DAMAGE AWARD
DID DAMAGE AWARD CHANGE ON AMOUNT AWARDED
APPEAL?
(0) No Jury Amount:
(I) Yes, lowered District Court Amount:
(2) Yes, reinstated or raised
(3) not applicable; P Lost on appeal Appeals Court Amount:
JUDICIAL INFORMATION
















NUMBER OF VOTES CAST
Majority - Concurrence __
** IF SIGNED OPINION, THEN PUT THE AUTHOR OF THE OPINION INTO JUDGE I
Dissent
2001]





































































spinal cord injury) (1)
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ALLEGATIONS / ISSUES I
(1) Pro-P; (2) Pro-D; (99) non-ascertainable
JUDGE 1 JUDGE 2 JUDGE 3
-Major Life Activity - Non-Work
-Major Life Activity - Work
MLA unknown
___ P Actually Disabled
-_ P Regarded as Disabled
___ Record of P's Disability
__ Association with Disabled Person (P need not be
disabled)
___ Otherwise Qualified/Essential Functions
Reasonable Accommodation
Medical Exams (pre-employment or current)
___ Non-Medical Exams/Testing (typing test, etc.)
___ Terms and Conditions: Non-Monetary (change in
work shift, etc.)
___ Terms and Conditions: Monetary (change in





Harassment/Hostile Work Environment (pre-
opposition)
___ Retaliation (post-opposition)




Direct threat to health or safety of others
No knowledge of disability
udicial estoppel.J
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